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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-4091 
___________ 
 
HAZEL VARGAS SUNAZ, 
 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A045 776 462) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Leo Finston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 25, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Hazel Vargas Sunaz, a citizen of the Philippines, entered the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident in June 1997, when she was approximately 15 years old.  In 
April 2004, Sunaz pleaded guilty to distributing or dispensing a controlled dangerous 
substance (cocaine).   See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5a(1).  She was sentenced to three 
years of probation.
1
   
 In October 2010, the Government charged Sunaz with removability under 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)], 
as an alien who, after admission, was convicted of violating a law relating to a controlled 
substance.  Sunaz appeared before an IJ, conceded that she was removable, and applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  As a basis for relief, Sunaz claimed that she is a lesbian, that 
she was harassed and assaulted in her hometown because of her sexual orientation, and 
that she feared for her safety if she were to be removed to the Philippines.   
 The IJ found “overall that [Sunaz‟s] testimony was generally consistent and 
sufficiently detailed in order to make a positive credibility finding in this matter.”  
Moreover, the IJ concluded that Sunaz “has presented extremely sympathetic facts,” 
                                                 
1
 Sunaz admitted to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that she was convicted of the same 
offense in January 2009, and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment.  No evidence 
of the 2009 conviction appears in the Administrative Record, and that conviction was not 
charged in the Notice to Appear as a basis for Sunaz‟s removability.   
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noted that she “has extensive ties to the community and a strong support network in the 
United States,” and stated she “does belong to a particular social group that is worthy of 
protection under the laws of this country.”  Because of her drug conviction, however, the 
IJ concluded that Sunaz was ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal under INA 
§ 241(b)(3)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)], and withholding of removal under the CAT.  
With respect to the only form of relief available−deferral of removal under the CAT−the 
IJ held that Sunaz had not met her burden of demonstrating that it is more likely than not 
that she would be tortured.  Sunaz appealed.  
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Sunaz‟s appeal.  The Board 
concluded that Sunaz‟s 2004 “conviction for drug distribution is an aggravated felony 
. . ., and therefore a particularly serious crime that bars her from asylum.”  See INA 
§§ 208(b)(2)(A)(ii); 208(b)(2)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii); 1158 (b)(2)(B)(i)].  
The Board also concluded that, for purposes of withholding of removal, Sunaz‟s 2004 
conviction was presumptively a particularly serious crime, see INA § 241(b)(3)(B) [8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)], and that Sunaz had not rebutted that presumption with evidence 
of “extraordinary and compelling circumstances.”2  In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 
                                                 
2
 The Board also held that Sunaz‟s 2009 conviction−which was not charged as a basis for 
her removal−“is per se a particularly serious crime that bars withholding of removal.”  
We note, however, that the “particularly serious crime” inquiry is confined to the facts 
underlying the crime upon which removal is predicated.  Lavira v. Att‟y Gen., 478 F.3d 
158, 162, 165 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
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(A.G. 2002).  Finally, the BIA held that Sunaz had failed to demonstrate that she was 
eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.  Sunaz filed a timely pro se petition for 
review of the BIA‟s decision. 
 We generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against a criminal 
alien, like Sunaz, who is removable for having committed an offense covered in INA 
§ 237(a)(2).  INA § 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)].  We retain jurisdiction, 
however, to review constitutional claims, “pure questions of law,” and “issues of 
application of law to fact, where the facts are undisputed and not the subject of 
challenge.”  Kamara v. Att‟y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005).  Thus, we can 
review the Board‟s determination that Sunaz‟s offense was an “aggravated felony” and 
“particularly serious.”3  See Jeune v. Att‟y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(exercising plenary review over petitioner‟s legal argument that he was not convicted of  
aggravated felony); Alaka v. Att‟y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 103 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that  
                                                 
3
 The Government asserts that we lack jurisdiction over Sunaz‟s attempt to challenge her 
aggravated felon status because she did not raise the issue before the BIA.  See INA 
§ 242(d)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)]; Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (stating that “an alien is required to raise and exhaust his or her remedies as to 
each claim or ground for relief if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of 
that claim”).  We disagree.  In her brief on appeal to the BIA, Sunaz argued that the IJ 
erred in denying her asylum and withholding applications because of her convictions.  
Joseph v. Att‟y Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing a “liberal exhaustion 
policy”).  Moreover, the BIA affirmed the IJ‟s conclusion that Sunaz‟s 2004 conviction 
was an aggravated felony.  Lin v. Att‟y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 123- 24 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(noting that when the BIA sua sponte addresses an otherwise unexhausted issue, failure to 
raise the issue on administrative appeal may be excused).   
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petitioner “has raised a question of law by asserting that the IJ made a legal error in 
determining that her crime was „particularly serious‟”).  “[F]actual or discretionary 
determinations continue to fall outside [our] jurisdiction . . . .”  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 
434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 An alien who has been “convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime” and deemed a “danger to the community of the United States” is ineligible for 
asylum, withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)], or 
withholding of removal pursuant to the CAT.  INA §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)]; 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)]; 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(d)(2).  For purposes of asylum eligibility, an alien who has been convicted of 
an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious 
crime.  INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i).  With respect to eligibility for withholding of removal, an 
alien shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime (1) where 
she has been convicted of an aggravated felony for which she has been sentenced to an 
aggregate term of imprisonment of at least five years, or, (2) where the “Attorney General 
. . . determin[es] that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime.”  INA § 241(b)(3)(B). 
 We agree that Sunaz‟s 2004 New Jersey conviction constitutes an aggravated 
felony using the hypothetical federal felony approach.  Under this approach, we must 
determine whether the state drug conviction is punishable as a felony under the 
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Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).  Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 306 (3d Cir. 
2002); see also Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 2001).  Generally, when 
determining whether an alien‟s conviction is for an aggravated felony, we may look only 
to the statutory definition of the offense, and may not consider the particular facts 
underlying a conviction.  Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147-48 (3d Cir. 2004).  There 
is an exception to this so-called categorical approach, permitting a court to look beyond 
the face of the statute to charging documents when “some but not all” convictions under a 
statute would satisfy the requirements of an aggravated felony.  See id. at 160, 162. 
Sunaz was convicted under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5a(1), which provides that it is 
unlawful 
 [t]o manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his control 
with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous 
substance or controlled substance analog . . . . 
 
A conviction under this statute is analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which provides that  
 it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance. 
 
Cf. Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:35-5b(11)−which criminalizes possession with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense at least one ounce (and less than five pounds) of 
marijuana−generally proscribes the same conduct as § 841(a)(1)).  The CSA, however, 
includes an exception for violations of § 841(a) that involve the distribution of a small 
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amount of marijuana for no remuneration.  Such violations are punished as 
misdemeanors.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4).  Thus, state marijuana offenses are equivalent 
to a federal drug felony only if they involve remuneration or more than a “small amount” 
of marijuana.  Evanson v. Att‟y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 In this case, the IJ and BIA determined that this exemption did not apply because 
Sunaz‟s 2004 conviction involved cocaine, not marijuana.  To reach this conclusion, the 
IJ and the BIA applied the “modified categorical approach,” looking beyond the statute of 
conviction.  See Garcia v. Att‟y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Statutes 
phrased in the disjunctive may invite inquiry into the record of conviction if it is unclear 
from the face of the statute whether the conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony.”).  
This approach applies to cases resolved by guilty pleas, and permits courts to consider the 
“statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of the plea 
colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 
assented.”   Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 20-23 (2005).  Sunaz‟s Judgment 
of Conviction indicates that she pleaded guilty to Count Three of the Indictment, which 
pertained to a violation of § 2C:35-5a(1), in general.  Importantly, however, the 
Indictment indicates that Sunaz was charged in the Third Count with “knowingly or 
purposely . . . dispens[ing] or distribut[ing] cocaine . . . .”  Thus, examination of the 
record under the modified categorical approach supports the determination that Sunaz‟s 
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2004 conviction involved cocaine and thereby qualified as an aggravated felony, which is 
per se a particularly serious crime.  INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 Aliens who have been convicted of a particularly serious crime are also ineligible 
for withholding of removal.  INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii).  In the withholding of removal 
context, particularly serious crimes include all aggravated felonies for which the alien 
was sentenced to imprisonment for five or more years, as well as those crimes that the 
Attorney General deems to be particularly serious “notwithstanding the length of 
sentence imposed.” INA § 241(b)(3)(B); Lavira, 478 F.3d at 161.  In In re Y-L-, the 
Attorney General concluded that drug trafficking crimes, like Sunaz‟s, presumptively 
constitute particularly serious crimes, but acknowledged “the possibility of the very rare 
case where an alien may be able to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances” rebutting that presumption.4  23 I. & N. Dec. at 276.  Here, the IJ 
concluded that “although [Sunaz] has presented many sympathetic factors, none of them 
                                                 
4
 The Attorney General set forth six requirements that an alien would have to satisfy as a 
prerequisite for consideration of whether “other, more unusual circumstances” might 
“justify departure from the default interpretation that drug trafficking felonies are 
„particularly serious crimes.‟”   Lavira, 478 F.3d at 162 (quoting In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. at 277).  Such an “unusual circumstance[]” requires at least these factors:  “(1) a 
very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very modest amount of money paid for 
the drugs in the offending transaction; (3) merely peripheral involvement by the alien in 
the criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the absence of any violence . . .; (5) 
the absence of any organized crime or terrorist organization involvement . . .; and (6) the 
absence of any adverse or harmful effect . . . on juveniles.”  In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 
276-77.    
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diminish the severity of her criminal record.”  Citing In re Y-L-, the BIA held that Sunaz 
“has not met her burden of proof to rebut the presumption, by demonstrating 
„extraordinary and compelling‟ circumstances . . . .”  Although Sunaz notes that she did 
not commit a violent crime, she does not otherwise suggest that the circumstances of her 
drug offense would have satisfied the In re Y-L- factors.  Moreover, our review of the 
record reveals nothing to suggest that Sunaz qualifies for the “extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances” exception.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the 
BIA did not err in affirming the IJ‟s decision that Sunaz was ineligible for withholding of 
removal. 
 Notwithstanding the particularly serious crime disqualifications, Sunaz remained 
eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT.  With respect to CAT claims, the question 
of the likelihood of torture is a mixed one, comprised of a factual component (“what is 
likely to happen to the petitioner if removed”) and a legal one (whether “what is likely to 
happen amount[s] to the legal definition of torture”).  Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att‟y Gen., 
No. 09-4719, − F.3d −, 2011 WL 6016134, at *5 n.6 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2011) (quoting 
Kaplun v. Att‟y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Thus, we lack jurisdiction over 
Sunaz‟s argument that the BIA erred in concluding that she would not likely be targeted 
by Philippine government officials.  We have jurisdiction, however, to the extent that 
Sunaz‟s pro se brief challenges the BIA‟s application of the law governing CAT 
protection to the undisputed facts of record.  Toussaint v. Att‟y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 412 
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n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).  Sunaz alleged that she had been harassed in the Philippines because 
of her sexual orientation.  She claimed that while living there she was often teased and 
beaten by other students.  In 2007, Sunaz returned to the Philippines to attend her 
grandmother‟s funeral.  While there, she was taunted by a group of young men at a flea 
market because of her appearance.  One of the men slapped her in the face.  The police 
were called, but they did not take any action.  Sunaz claimed that she will face the same 
type of harm if she is removed to the Philippines.  These facts, however, fail to 
demonstrate that what is likely to happen to Sunaz satisfies the legal definition of torture.  
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  Therefore, we will not disturb the BIA‟s conclusion that Sunaz 
failed to meet her burden of proof for deferral of removal under the CAT. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
5
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 The Government‟s Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
